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Abstract
This paper draws on the ‘Fitting Attitudes’ analysis of value to argue
that we should take the concept of fittingness (rather than value) as
our normative primitive. I will argue that the fittingness framework
enhances the clarity and expressive power of our normative theorizing.
Along the way, we will see how the fittingness framework illuminates
our understanding of various moral theories, and why it casts doubt
on the Global Consequentialist idea that acts and (say) eye colours
are normatively on a par. We will see why even consequentialists, in
taking rightness to be in some sense determined by goodness, should
not think that rightness is conceptually reducible to goodness. Finally,
I will use the fittingness view to explicate the distinction between
consequentialist and deontological theories, with particular attention
to the contentious case of Rule Consequentialism.
∗Please cite final published version once available.
†For helpful feedback on this paper, I’d like to thank Ryan Cook, Rob Lawlor, Errol
Lord, Philip Pettit, Doug Portmore, Andrew Reisner, Peter Singer, Michael Smith, Nic
Southwood, Helen Yetter Chappell, and audiences at Princeton, ANU, and the PEA Soup
blog.
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1 Introduction
Consequentialists have traditionally followed Moore (1903a) in taking the
concept of value as their normative primitive. This metaethical view may
be accompanied by the assumption that axiology exhausts normative ethics:
i.e., it’s a substantive question what’s valuable (good or bad), but there’s no
further question of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Some recent theorists have embraced
the implication that we should not privilege acts as uniquely subject to nor-
mative evaluation in terms of ‘rightness’. Instead, they claim, any normative
status that’s applicable to acts, can just as well apply to other possible ob-
jects of evaluation, from eye colours to climates. Call this the Parity Thesis.
Such parity might be achieved by either shrinking or extending the domain of
‘rightness’. These two possibilities are reflected in Scalar and Global Conse-
quentialisms, respectively. Global Consequentialism defines the ‘right’ x (for
any category of evaluand x, be it acts, climates, or whatever) as the best x
of those available (Pettit and Smith 2000). It thus indiscriminately extends
‘rightness’ talk to all evaluands. Scalar Consequentialism, on the other hand,
does away with ‘rightness’ altogether, and merely has us evaluate acts (like
anything else) as more or less good.1
1 At least, this is one natural form that Scalar Consequentialism might take. Call it
Evaluative Scalar Consequentialism: the view that all we can say about actions is that
they have more or less value, and there’s no other normative claims — not even about,
say, reasons for action — to make at all. (I see this as a terminological variant of Global
Consequentialism, which will be my main foil for the remainder of the paper.) On the other
hand, we can imagine a version of the view which, despite rejecting the binary distinction
between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, nonetheless allows that we can indeed make normative claims
about choiceworthiness (or reasons for action) over and above evaluative claims, it’s just
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An alternative tradition follows Brentano (1902) and Sidgwick (1907)2 in
understanding value in terms of a more fundamental notion of desirability or
what we have (fitting) reason to desire.3 In this paper, I make the case for
taking this notion of fittingness as the fundamental concept for use in nor-
mative theorizing. The Moorean’s value claims can still be captured within
the fittingness framework as a matter of the object’s being fit to desire. But
by appealing to the notion of ‘fittingness’ more generally, we expand our
theory’s expressive power. Not only can we talk about value (what’s fit to
desire), but also what’s fit to believe, and — more importantly for our pur-
poses — what it is fitting (right)4 to choose to do. This conceptual framework
allows us to make substantive new claims about the rightness of acts, that
that this further normative status is also a matter of degree. This more sophisticated
view — call it Normative Scalar Consequentialism — is compatible with my rejection of
the parity thesis.
I’m not certain which version Norcross is advocating in his (2006), for while he does
speak of ‘reasons for action’, it isn’t clear whether or not he thinks such claims are con-
ceptually reducible to value claims.
2 Andrew Reisner pointed out to me that it’s controversial to what extent we should
characterize Sidgwick as a fitting attitudes theorist — Moore himself did not think of
Sidgwick as such (Moore 1903b). Nonetheless, I follow Smith (2010) in finding Sidgwick’s
talk of ‘desirability’ and ‘rational ends’, e.g. in section I.ix.3 of his (1907), at least highly
suggestive.
3 Scanlon (1998) and other deontologists understand value more broadly as warrant-
ing various kinds of pro-attitude (e.g. admiration, respect). For simplicity, I will focus
exclusively on the consequentialist conception of value as desirability.
4 Admittedly, the notion of fitting choice does not exactly correspond to the ordinary
deontic notions of obligation or permissibility. In particular, as noted in fn.1, I don’t mean
to rule out the kind of ‘normative scalar consequentialism’ that treats moral rightness as
coming in degrees, with no sharp line between those acts that are sufficiently fitting or
justified to qualify as ‘permissible’ and those that aren’t. For current purposes, the relevant
similarity to our ordinary talk of ‘right action’ is just that we’re talking about a kind of
normative status that applies distinctively to one’s choice of action. For more on the
fuzziness of ‘rightness’-talk, see Lawlor (2009, Appendix A).
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are not merely disguised claims about value restated in different words. We
will also see that the fittingness view provides a more ecumenical framework
for normative theorizing, allowing logical space for both consequentialist and
deontological theories to emerge.
1.1 Conceptual Frameworks
To get a firmer grip on the notion, we may understand a ‘conceptual frame-
work’ to be a set of interrelated concepts, with some specified as primitives,
and others defined in terms of the primitives. The conceptual framework
for a domain is, in effect, the expressive toolkit through which we can make
first order claims on some topic. In the case of the normative domain, I
suggest three desiderata against which we may assess candidate conceptual
frameworks:
1. It must provide adequate conceptual resources for us to express any
expressible normative truth.5
2. It should, so far as possible, remain neutral on the disputes of first-order
normative ethics.
3. It should reflect and illuminate any natural ‘joints ’ in the ontological
structure of the normative domain (insofar as the normative domain is
5 Of course, most normative claims involve the use of non-normative concepts too.
So a more precise statement of the first desideratum is that the conceptual framework
for our normative domain must provide adequate conceptual resources for expressing the
normative parts of any expressible normative truth. It may require supplementation by
non-normative conceptual frameworks in order to express the non-normative parts of a
normative claim. Hopefully the intended idea is clear enough.
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structured).
These desiderata are motivated by the philosophical role that we are seeking
to fill. We are looking for a conceptual framework within which to conduct
our first-order normative inquiry. A candidate conceptual framework will be
of little use to us if we cannot use it to express the answers we seek. Gross
non-neutrality in a framework similarly precludes using it for this purpose,
insofar as it simply presupposes answers to the questions we wished to ask.
The third desideratum is less strictly essential, but clearly a nice feature
to have if possible. For example, it may help illuminate which first-order
debates are genuinely significant, whereas a framework with (e.g.) redundant
concepts risks encouraging terminological disputes and other confusions.
1.2 Roadmap
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, I motivate the fit-
tingness view in relation to other positions in the literature, with particular
reference to its expressive power. Section 3 pits the fittingness framework
against value primitivism with respect to the third desideratum. To antic-
ipate: the fittingness view implies that there is a distinct normative status
corresponding to each kind of judgment-sensitive ‘rational output’ that can
be assessed as fitting or unfitting to the situation, e.g., beliefs, desires, and
actions. So, in particular, there’s a distinctive normative status that is appli-
cable to actions, with no analogue for mere evaluands like eye colours. I offer
several reasons to think that this accurately reflects an important ‘structural’
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difference between judgment-sensitive and non-judgment-sensitive evaluands,
thus arguing against the value primitivist’s Parity Thesis, and by extension,
against Global Consequentialism.
Section 4 uses the above asymmetry in the fittingness framework to defend
Act Consequentialism against the Global Consequentialist’s charge that, in
rejecting the Parity Thesis, we are “privileging” acts in a theoretically objec-
tionable way. Whereas advocates of Global Consequentialism have claimed
that theirs is the view that Act Consequentialists were striving for all along,
I argue that the reverse is true: Global Consequentialists who accept the
fittingness view should be led to Act Consequentialism.
Section 5 defuses an important objection by showing how to understand
the structure of deontological and rule consequentialist theories in terms of
the fittingness view. Finally, in section 6, I consider the objection that facts
about fitting choice may reduce to facts about fitting desire. I argue that,
while the two may typically coincide, no such reduction is possible, at least
not without collapsing the consequentialism-deontology distinction.
2 Reasons-Talk and Fitting Attitudes
To begin, let me clarify how Scanlonian ‘reasons fundamentalism’ (the view
that takes reasons as the fundamental normative concept) fits into the dis-
pute between the fittingness view and value primitivism. I see the fittingness
framework as very much in the spirit of reasons fundamentalism. My worry
about starting with reasons-talk is that in practice it seems to invite unnec-
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essary ambiguity and confusion. Normative reasons are typically introduced
as ‘facts that count in favour’ of an act or attitude, but there are two very
different kinds of ‘favouring’ that might be invoked here.6 This is seen, for
example, in the distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘practical’ reasons for
belief. Suppose that a prankster demon will reward me for believing that
grass is purple. This fact might be said to ‘count in favour’ of the belief,
in one obvious sense: it establishes that there is (instrumental) value to my
having this belief — it would be a fortunate state for me to be in. But there’s
a very different sense in which evidence, e.g. the fact that grass looks green,
‘counts against’ believing grass to be purple. Evidence counts for or against
belief in a proposition by speaking to whether the proposition is true and
hence belief-worthy or fit to believe.
We can similarly distinguish value-based reasons and fitting reasons for
desire, say if we would be rewarded for desiring that others suffer. Suffering
is undesirable: it has qualities that ‘count against’ desiring it, in the sense
of rendering such desires unfitting to their objects. But external incentives
may ‘count in favour’ of such perverse desires, by rendering their possession
instrumentally valuable.
In light of this ambiguity, it is unhelpful to take the notion of ‘counting in
favour’ as primitive (in our normative theorizing). We must further specify
6 This distinction is typically analysed in terms of ‘object-given’ versus ‘state-given’
reasons for attitudes. I avoid this terminology because there may be tricky cases where the
object of the attitude is in some sense responsible for our having what should intuitively
be characterized as a state-given reason. Cf. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004).
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that our conception of ‘reasons’ is that of counting in favour in the sense
of rendering an attitude fitting, rather than merely fortunate. Otherwise,
the inclusion of value-based reasons leads to the ‘Wrong Kind of Reasons’
problem (Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004) for analysing value in
terms of reasons for desire. That is, an external incentive to desire suffering
would then suffice to give you “reason to desire” suffering, though it clearly
wouldn’t make suffering itself good, thus undermining the identification of
what’s good with what we have reason to desire.
We avoid this problem if we start from the unambiguous notion of fit-
tingness: external incentives to desire suffering don’t make suffering itself
any more desirable (fit to desire), after all. So rather than taking reasons
directly as primitive, we do better to reconstruct the notion of ‘reasons for
desire’ explicitly in terms of desirability characteristics — features in virtue
of which an object is fit to desire.7 This allows us to better avoid objections
when it comes time to analyse value in terms of our normative primitive.
The unhelpful ambiguity likewise infects other general normative terms
like ‘ought’. There seems a sense in which you ought to believe/desire
what’s fitting, and another sense in which we can say that you ‘ought’ to
believe/desire in whatever way would be best. It doesn’t seem like there’s
any way to balance and combine these into a single normative conclusion;
7 Rather than starting from the features that render an object fitting to desire, we
might follow Smith (1994, 2010) in taking as fundamental the ideally rational psychology,
and then understand reasons for desire (or desirability characteristics) as features that
would figure in the ideal agent’s desires. I mean to remain neutral on this.
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rather, the two kinds of evaluations are giving different answers to differ-
ent questions.8 So rather than starting with general normative terms like
‘reasons’, ‘counts in favour’, ‘ought’, or the like, we should start from our un-
derstanding of the two more specific kinds of normative evaluation: the fitting
(or rationally warranted)9 and the fortunate (or instrumentally valuable).
We need to be able to make both kinds of evaluation, in order to make
sense of the cases discussed above. But we can achieve this using fittingness
evaluations alone. For whenever a mental state would be fortunate, that
means that it would be desirable — fitting to desire — to possess that mental
state. To illustrate: the belief that grass is purple is unfitting,10 but it’s
8 As we’ll see below, we can understand the two questions as (1) is p believ-
able/desirable? and (2) is the belief/desire that p desirable? Even if the answers diverge
(suppose the answers are ‘no’ and ‘yes’, respectively), an agent could be fit in both re-
spects: that is, he could reasonably fail to believe p, whilst reasonably desiring to possess
the irrational-but-fortunate belief. Cf. Parfit (2011, Appendix A).
9 I don’t here mean to take any stand on the issue of ‘objective’ vs. ‘subjective’ oughts,
or how incomplete and misleading evidence affects the normative status of attitudes. I’m
inclined towards a pluralistic stance: there’s an ‘objective’ sense of fittingness that cor-
responds to objective reasons, or what we might call ‘objective rationality’ — roughly,
what would be rational given full information, modulo the conditional fallacy (Shope
1978). I take there to also be various ‘subjective’ or ‘evidence-relative’ senses of fitting-
ness, which correspond to ordinary evaluations of rationality or reasonableness for fallible
non-omniscient agents. For simplicity, we may focus on fully-informed ideal agents, for
whom ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ norms coincide.
10 Some people report finding it just as intuitive, to their ear, to apply the word ‘fitting’
to instrumentally valuable beliefs like this. I mean to use ‘fittingness’ as a technical term
to pick out precisely that intuitive normative concept that assesses (e.g.) desires according
to whether their objects are genuinely desirable, and beliefs according to whether their
object merits belief, etc. In other words, it is the normative concept which encompasses
‘epistemic’ rather than ‘practical’ reasons for belief, generalized to apply to other atti-
tudes as well. You should associate it with words like ‘warranted’, ‘appropriate’, ‘right’ or
‘correct’, and (on the negative side) ‘crazy’ and ‘perverse’; not with ‘useful’, ‘fortunate’,
‘important’, or (on the negative side) ‘disastrous’. I hope readers find it intuitively com-
pelling that there is a general notion in this vicinity which is the common thread between
credible beliefs, desiring what’s desirable, and fearing the fearsome. There is likewise
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perfectly reasonable to desire to have the belief, in light of the proffered
reward. Likewise, though others’ suffering is itself undesirable, it may be
fitting to desire (for instrumental reasons) that you (perversely) desire that
others suffer. In this way, value claims are analysable in terms of fittingness
claims, allowing us to take the latter as our sole normative primitive without
any cost to the expressive power of our normative theorising.
One might wonder whether we could just as well reverse this approach,
and seek an analysis of fittingness in terms of value. But the prospects for
such an analysis seem dim. For while there is an intimate conceptual connec-
tion between value and desirability, there is not any such obvious connection
between value and (say) believability. The evidence may render belief in P
fitting even when both P itself and your believing of P are unfortunate or
disvaluable. We can even imagine worlds governed by truth-hating demons,
where it is not even good as a general rule to believe what’s supported by
the evidence. So there seems little hope for analysing fitting attitudes in
terms of value, the way that we can easily analyse value in terms of fitting
attitudes.
This asymmetry suggests that the Fittingness framework has greater ex-
pressive power in the following sense: Any value claim can also be expressed
in terms of fittingness, whereas it is not the case that all fittingness claims
can also be expressed in terms of value. If we want to be able to make
something commonly inappropriate about crazy/incredible beliefs, perverse desires, and
irrational phobias. We may capture this commonality by saying that each attitude is, in
its own way, an unfitting response to its object.
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both kinds of claims, using only one kind of primitive, then this suggests the
primitive we should choose is that of fittingness, rather than value.
My remarks so far have suggested a strong presumptive case for taking
fittingness as our normative primitive. This is a variation of a view held by
many philosophers, including Scanlon (1998, 2009) and Darwall (2006). The
original contribution of this paper comes next, as I develop the framework
and demonstrate its theoretical payoff.
3 Rational Outputs and the Scope of Normative Theorizing
The scope of our normative theorizing is constrained by our normative prim-
itives. Everything there is to say can be said using the primitive concepts —
otherwise we’d need additional primitives. So, if Mooreans are right to take
the concept of value as their sole normative primitive, it must be that the
value facts in some sense exhaust the normative facts: there’s nothing more
to say — or, at least, nothing distinctively normative — once we’ve settled
what’s good and bad. In particular, this means that there is no normative
status of ‘rightness’ or fittingness that applies distinctively to acts or choices,
as opposed to mere evaluands like eye colours and the global climate. All we
can say is that some acts are better or worse than others (in virtue of leading
to better or worse outcomes), in just the same way that some eye colours
may be better or worse than others (in virtue of leading to better or worse
outcomes). If we want to apply the term ‘right’ to the instrumentally best
acts, we may as well call the instrumentally best eye colour the ‘right’ one to
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have too — though of course this is not to make a substantive new claim, but
just to re-state the old evaluative claim using new words. In this way, value
primitivists are naturally led to a kind of Global Consequentialism (Pettit
and Smith 2000; Kagan 2000; Ord 2009), which we may examine here as a
kind of case study of the Parity Thesis.
The essence of Global Consequentialism, as it interests me here,11 is its
symmetrical treatment of acts and other, non-judgment-sensitive objects of
evaluation (what I call ‘mere evaluands’). Pettit and Smith (2000, 122) write:
“The crucial feature of global consequentialism is that it does not privilege
any category of evaluand.” Ord (ms) adds: “By encompassing all evaluands,
rather than just the most prominent ones, it maximizes its expressive power
while remaining nonarbitrary. Indeed, some systems of global consequential-
ism promise to be simpler than act-consequentialism itself, for by allowing
everything to be morally assessed [in the same way], they no longer need
an associated theory of acts.” (p.4) What’s distinctive about this view is
its whole-hearted embrace of the Parity Thesis that the normative domain
is symmetrically structured, such that actions and eye colours are on a par
when it comes to the ways in which we can normatively assess them. There’s
nothing special about judgment-sensitive evaluands, on this view. To think
otherwise, Global Consequentialists claim, would be to arbitrarily privilege
11 One might offer a strictly weaker view that merely defends a global definition of
rightness, whilst countenancing other normative evaluations — such as fittingness — that
have non-global scope. But this would amount to a mere terminological variant of the act
consequentialism that I defend in §4.
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acts.
The value primitivist might try to escape this commitment to the parity
thesis by constructing a new concept of ‘rightness’ out of a combination of the
normative concept value plus the non-normative concept can (as it figures in
the slogan, ‘ought implies can’).12 So, for example, to call something ‘right’
might just be to say that: (i) the agent in question could choose to do it, and
(ii) this choice would produce at least as much value as any other choice the
agent could have made. Assuming that actions are just those things that an
agent ‘can’ — in the relevant sense — do, it seems that the value primitivist
has succeeded in securing access to a new normative term that applies to
acts but not to eye colours, as desired.
I have two main objections to this. Firstly, it is not at all clear that
this newly constructed concept really allows the value primitivist to make
claims with any new normative impact. It’s true that they can make a new
claim that is partly normative, e.g. ‘φ-ing is the right thing to do.’ But
this is decomposable into the conjunction of two claims: (i) the agent can
φ, and (ii) no other option produces more value than φ-ing. Note that only
the first claim is new (given a context in which we’ve already settled the
value facts), whereas only the second claim is normative. So this move does
not really allow the value primitivist to make additional normative claims
in any interesting sense. It merely allows them the cheap victory of making
conjunctive claims that are new in one respect and normative in another.
12 I owe this suggestion to Nic Southwood.
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My second worry about this proposal is that it seems ad hoc, or lacking
a principled basis for being restricted in scope to actions. After all, the
normative part of the new conjunctive claim — i.e., the conjunct which
claims that the object maximizes value — is just as applicable to eye colours
as it is to actions. Presumably the underlying idea was meant to be that
the conjunction of ‘value’ and ‘can’ claims is normatively significant in a
way that goes beyond the mere sum of its parts (so to speak). This is a
plausible claim, but I do not think it is one that the value primitivist can
make. If we have an independent grasp of rightness, then we can claim
that acts that are the best an agent can do possess this further normative
property of rightness. But such a claim would be trivialized by the value
primitivist’s conceptual reduction of ‘rightness’ to ‘the best an agent can do’.
It would be what Parfit (2011, 71) calls a ‘concealed tautology’: equivalent
to the claim that acts that are the best an agent can do possess the property
of being the best that agent can do. This is not yet to say that there’s
anything normatively significant about being the best an agent can do, over
and above the evaluative component of the claim. So I don’t think that value
primitivists can escape commitment to the parity thesis so easily.
Even so, the value primitivist might at least cushion the blow by pointing
out some pragmatic reasons why we might tend to be more interested in
evaluating actions than, say, eye colours.13 Actions are the means by which
13 Thanks to Philip Pettit, Andrew Reisner, and Peter Singer for pressing me on this
point.
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we may voluntarily affect the world (and the amount of value in it). Moreover,
our future behaviour may itself be influenced by praise and blame, whereas
eye colours tend not to be so responsive. So even upon accepting the parity
thesis, the value primitivist needn’t face any problems explaining the act-
centric focus of our ordinary moral practices. I’m happy to grant that. My
objections to the parity thesis will emerge shortly (and more strongly in
section 6, where I argue that we need an independent concept of rightness
in order to maintain the consequentialism-deontology distinction). For now,
I just want to re-iterate that value primitivists are committed to seeing no
deep or principled difference in the range of normative assessments we can
make of acts and eye colours, respectively.
The Fittingness view provides us with more options. As we have seen,
value claims can be understood as claims about what it is fitting to desire.
Now, it’s true that this sort of normative assessment applies without restric-
tion: we can ask whether some eye colour is fit to be preferred over others,
just as we can ask whether some choice or action is fit to be preferred over
others. But that isn’t all that there is to say about what’s fitting. In addition
to these questions of desirability, we can also ask what it is fitting to believe,
feel, and choose.
This last option gives rise to a form of normative assessment that applies
distinctively to acts (understood as the direct implementation of a choice),
as a matter of principle. That is, in addition to asking whether some chosen
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act is fit to desire, we can ask whether it is itself fitting (qua choice).14 No
such additional question arises for eye colours. We can ask whether some eye
colour is fit to desire, but there’s no further question whether the eye colour
is itself rationally fitting — eye colours just aren’t subject to direct rational
criticism in this way. It cannot be a rational failing for one’s eyes to be a
certain colour, the way it might be a rational failing (in some circumstances)
to choose to bring about such an outcome.15 The Fittingness view thus
expands the scope of our moral theorizing to include a normative status
distinctive to acts: whether they are fit to choose, or — in more colloquial
terms — morally right.
I now want to argue that we should reject the Global Consequentialist’s
parity thesis, and hence favour the fittingness view over value primitivism.
Consider again the completely general Global Consequentialist formula that
the ‘right’ x is simply the best (most utility-maximizing) x of those available,
where ‘x’ might be replaced by ‘act’, ‘eye colour’, or any other category of
evaluand (Pettit and Smith 2000). I’ve been arguing that the Fittingness
14 To clarify the distinction between choice and desire: I take desire to be a persisting
mental state that has some associated degree of weight. Any one desire, insofar as it may
be outweighed by others, leaves open the question of what to do. Choice, on the other
hand, is the process of settling what to do. In the case of Buridan’s ass, caught between
two indiscernible bales of hay, I take it that the fitting response is to desire that you have
either, but to choose either particular one. See section 6 for further discussion.
15 One may question whether acts are really subject to direct rational criticism, given
that their rational status would seem to derive from the rationality of the choice to so act.
I’m happy to grant that choice is the more fundamental object of assessment. But insofar
as it is natural to understand the choice as partly constituting the action, an assessment of
the choice is ipso facto an assessment of the action. Choices and eye colours, by contrast,
stand in no such intimate relation.
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view shows there to be an important difference in normative structure here:
there are some kinds of normative assessment that can be made of acts that
cannot be made of eye colours. Though one may stipulatively define a sense
of ‘right’ (or ‘ought’) that applies to everything including eye colours, there is
an importantly natural, non-stipulative sense that applies only to judgment-
sensitive evaluands (with no corresponding normative concept that applies
just to non-judgment-sensitive evaluands). But this analysis will not convince
someone who is not inclined to accept the fittingness view to begin with.
A more neutral way to bring out the difference in normative structure
between actions and mere evaluands (like eye colour) is to think about how
the relevant set of ‘available options’ is fixed in the above formula. In case
of actions, the ‘ought implies can’ principle invokes a very particular sense
of possibility: something like rational power, perhaps. That is, the relevant
options are naturally restricted to something like what the agent would suc-
ceed in doing if they had the intention to do it16 — though the precise details
don’t matter for my purposes.
The assessment of eye colours presents us with two notable points of
contrast. First, there does not seem to be any naturally privileged set of
options for mere evaluands; the relevant sense of ‘availability’ will instead
presumably vary depending on conversational context. (For example, one
speaker may be interested in the eye colour that one ‘ought’ to have amongst
those genetically possible for a child of one’s parents, whereas another may
16 Thanks to Michael Smith for this suggestion.
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be concerned to evaluate amongst all of those humanly possible. There’s no
fact of the matter as to which of these is the eye colour that you really ‘ought’
to have.) This looks an awful lot like ordinary evaluation — unlike in the
case of actions, where the shift to ‘ought’-talk brought with it a principled
determination of the available options, and hence an unequivocal answer to
the question of what act you ought to perform.
Secondly, eye colours are not judgment-sensitive, or directly subject to
rational influence, the way that actions are. Judging that one ought to have
blue eyes will not even tend to make it so. In this sense one cannot possess
one’s eye colour for (normative) reasons, the way that one can believe, desire,
and act for reasons. We may demand that others justify their beliefs, or their
actions, with adequate reasons. It does not make such sense to hold people
(directly) accountable or answerable for their eye colours.
So while one might insist that there is some stipulative sense in which
we “have reasons” to have the best available eye colour,17 this verbal victory
for the global consequentialist misses the point that there is a real differ-
ence in normative structure here that needs to be acknowledged. While we
can evaluate anything, against any arbitrary set of ‘alternatives’, there is
a special kind of normative assessment of rationally available actions that
has no analogue for other (mere) evaluands. This difference allows us to
make substantive claims about how we ought to act that are not just dis-
guised evaluative claims. The same cannot be said for ‘oughts’ of eye-colour
17 Thanks to Toby Ord and Michael Smith for pressing me on this point.
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possession.
These facts suggest that in order to track the natural ‘structure’ of the
normative domain — as per our third desideratum from §1.1 — normative
theorists need a conceptual framework that offers asymmetric treatments of
judgment-sensitive and non-judgment-sensitive evaluands. The Fittingness
view achieves this by positing norms of ‘fittingness’ that apply directly to
judgment-sensitive evaluands (belief, desire, action), one instance of which is
the more specific notion of fittingness to desire, which in turn applies globally
to all evaluands without restriction. The Fittingness view thus represents the
normative domain as appropriately (asymmetrically) structured: our norma-
tive primitive of fittingness applies immediately to judgment-sensitive eval-
uands, and only indirectly (as mediated through the fittingness norms for
desire) to everything else.
One needn’t accept the Fittingness view in order to secure this desidera-
tum, of course — a pluralist might combine the Moorean’s value primitivism
with an additional primitive concept of ‘rightness’. But the Fittingness view
is both more parsimonious and more powerful. We have seen that it is
more parsimonious in unifying both evaluative and non-evaluative normative
claims under the umbrella of the single normative primitive of ‘fittingness’.
What’s more, it is more powerful in that it provides us with an explanation of
why there is a distinctive form of normative assessment that applies only to
acts. The explanation is that there are distinct forms of normative (fitting-
ness) assessments corresponding to each of our judgment-sensitive rational
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outputs: e.g., beliefs, desires, and actions.
The Fittingness view tells us that the scope of normative theorizing is
fixed by the range of our rational outputs, as those are the things that can be
assessed as more or less fitting.18 At a minimum, we can identify assessments
of fitting belief as the province of epistemologists, fitting desire as the concern
of axiologists (value theorists), and — I suggest — fitting choice/action as
a further issue for normative ethicists. This list should hopefully provide a
plausible enough starting point, but I should stress that it is ultimately up
to our best moral psychology / theory of agency to identify any additional
rational outputs (e.g. emotions), and hence to further delineate the scope
for normative inquiry.
4 ‘Privileging’ Acts
Act Consequentialism is the view that the rightness of an action is deter-
mined by the value of the resulting state of affairs (compared to the available
alternatives). We may further specify that, according to act consequential-
ists, acts are the only items to which this normative status of ‘rightness’ may
apply.19 There is, in this sense, an important normative disparity claimed
between acts and (say) eye colours. We are now in a position to put to work
18 Darwall (2006) offers a similar suggestion: “In principle, there are as many normative
notions as items (action and attitudes) that can be normatively regulated.”
19 Technically, there may be an analogous status of ‘rightness’ or fittingness for other
judgment-sensitive evaluands such as belief, etc. But epistemological questions and the
like are outside the province of the moral theorist. The crucial point for now is just that
the Act Consequentialist is naturally taken to reject the parity thesis, and to instead see
an important asymmetry at least between acts and non-judgment-sensitive evaluands.
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the theoretical apparatus developed in previous sections, illuminating the de-
bate between Act and Global Consequentialists. In particular, we shall assess
the charge that act consequentialism “privileges” actions in a theoretically
objectionable way.
Let us first observe that all consequentialists start with an axiology, or
theory of value, which tells us what things are valuable or fitting to desire.
Given this starting point, the work that remains for their normative theory
is to use these evaluative facts to derive some further normative claims about
what we ought to do. We’ve seen that value primitivists are naturally led to
the view that there isn’t really anything more to say once we settle the value
facts. All the substantive work is done by their axiology, and so to call an
act ‘right’ is not to make a further claim at all, but is instead analytically
equivalent to calling it ‘best’ or value-maximizing. The substantive content
of this ‘Global Consequentialism’, over and above the axiology that might
be shared by any other form of consequentialism, is purely negative: it’s just
the claim that there isn’t anything more to say, beyond evaluating things
(including acts) for their desirability.
But we’ve seen that there is more for a moral theory to say than just
this. According to the fittingness view, in particular, we can assess acts
not just for their desirability (whether they are fit to desire), but also for
whether they themselves constitute fitting choices. This naturally supports
Act Consequentialism over Global Consequentialism (modulo the qualms
about ‘rightness’-talk mentioned in footnote 4). Act Consequentialists begin
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with an axiology (an account of fitting desire), and to this they add just
one new type of claim — a claim about what it is fitting (right) to do. The
claim “an act is right if and only if (and because) it produces at least as
much value as any available alternative” is no longer a mere analytic truth
or stipulative definition, but a substantive normative claim that relates one
normative property (fitting choice) to another (fitting desire).
Act Consequentialism invokes a normative status that applies distinc-
tively to acts, and thus succeeds in going beyond its axiology to make sub-
stantive new claims, when Global Consequentialism does not. This sug-
gests two reasons to prefer Act Consequentialism: first, because it has more
substance, and secondly, because it achieves this by better respecting the
structure and scope for normative theorizing revealed by the fittingness view
and our best moral psychology. When Global Consequentialists deny that
acts are subject to a distinctive form of normative evaluation (beyond the
generally available assessment of global desirability), this is both factually
incorrect and unnecessarily limiting.
I’ve argued that Global Consequentialists have erroneously neglected the
structural differences between normatively-assessable acts and mere evalu-
ands. It’s a mistake for a normative theory to treat everything on a par,
because it turns out that there’s a distinctive normative question that arises
for acts — namely, ‘are they morally right, or fitting to choose?’ — that
has no analogue in case of mere evaluands. But let me add a conciliatory
note. Global Consequentialists are right to insist that our axiological theory
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should assess each particular evaluand (including acts considered as mere
evaluands) directly and in its own right. Many philosophers have made the
contrary mistake of assuming that the best dispositions, for example, are
simply those that result in the best actions.20 To privilege actions in this
(axiological) sense is indeed a straightforward error. It is important not to
overlook the fact that dispositions of character can have good or bad effects
other than via their manifestation in action (Adams 1976; Parfit 1984; Rail-
ton 1984; Pettit and Smith 2000). For example, it might be good, for the
sake of deterrence, to have a transparent disposition to trigger a doomsday
device when attacked. This does not entail that there’s anything good about
the act of mass destruction. The value here accrues from (transparently)
possessing the disposition, not from exercising it.21 So it would be a mis-
take to think that acts resulting from beneficial dispositions must themselves
be beneficial. Each evaluand must be evaluated in its own right, as Global
Consequentialists rightly remind us.
But just because actions should not be axiologically privileged, this does
20 For example, Shaw (2006, 13) writes: “Consequentialists generally assess dispositions,
behavioral patterns, and character traits in the same instrumental way: one determines
which ones are good, and how good they are, by looking at the actions they lead to.”
Even Kagan (2000) arguably suffers from this oversight. After introducing the idea
of evaluating rules according to their propensity to produce more or less good actions,
Kagan claims that this is tantamount to “claim[ing] that rules should be evaluated directly
in terms of the goodness of their consequences.” (p.149) But this only follows if the
downstream actions are the only possible consequences of internalizing a rule, which we’ll
see is false.
21 Geoff Brennan pointed out to me that this is still a case where the disposition’s value
derives from its effect on (others’) actions. But we can just as well construct cases where,
e.g., the mere possession of a certain disposition tends to make one happier, or to produce
good effects in the world, in a way that is unmediated by any actions.
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not mean that there are no important normative-theoretical differences be-
tween acts and (say) eye colours. Act Consequentialists can — and should —
take care to avoid the axiological oversight that global consequentialists warn
against, whilst maintaining that there’s an important sense in which we can
assess acts, but not eye colours, as morally right or wrong (over and above
their being good or bad).
To summarize my argument thus far: The fittingness view implies that
the list of rational outputs (states or activities that are responsive to our
normative judgments, and can be assessed as more or less rationally ‘fitting’)
determines the scope of our normative theorizing. There are facts about
which features of an agent are rational outputs, and hence what kinds of
reasons there can be (e.g. reasons for belief, desire, and action). These moral
psychological facts are arguably ‘prior’ to the question of what particular
normative theory correctly specifies the contents of these various kinds of
reasons. So our normative theorizing should acknowledge and respect these
limitations. Consequentialists presuppose an account of our reasons for desire
(i.e., their axiology). They have no ambition to override epistemologists’
claims about our reasons for belief, nor do they tend to make claims about
the rationality of other attitudinal states like emotions. This would seem to
leave reasons for action as the only remaining target for further theorizing. So
it is by no means arbitrary for Act Consequentialists to add further normative
claims (i.e. besides what is already contained in their axiology) only about
how we ought to act. This is the only kind of claim that can plausibly
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be added, once we have settled all questions about what we have reason to
desire.
5 Analysing Rule Consequentialism
My analysis so far has presupposed that our theory of value settles all ques-
tions about what we have reason to desire: i.e., we should always prefer
what’s best.22 However, deontologists and rule consequentialists might seem
to deny this. (Here I’ll focus on the latter for simplicity.) Rule consequential-
ists hold that we ought to act in accordance with certain rules (the general
acceptance of which would maximize value) even on occasions when so acting
is not itself value-maximizing (Hooker 2000). This seems difficult to make
sense of if the value facts exhaustively specify our reasons for desire, since
by calling one act value-maximizing (worth preferring) but then prescribing
another as worth choosing, rule consequentialism would seem to imply that
we ought to hope that we act differently from how we ought to act. Such
a disconnect between rational preference and rational choice does not seem
especially coherent (Portmore 2007, 50). Yet rule consequentialism is surely
a coherent (if mistaken) view. What has gone wrong?
Most naturally, when the rule consequentialist prohibits the ‘best’ or
‘value-maximizing’ act, they do not really mean that the prohibited act is
desirable all things considered, but only antecedently desirable, i.e. before we
22 Note that our theory of value need not be impartial (‘agent-neutral’). If we each have
agent-relative reasons to prefer the welfare of our own children over that of strangers, for
example, then different states of affairs will be desirable relative to different people.
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consider the distinctive reasons for desire that derive from an act’s deontic
status as morally right or wrong. In this sense, their initial value theory is
inconclusive or incomplete.23 It accounts for only some of our reasons for
desire: agent-neutral welfarist reasons, perhaps. But these reasons for desire
are not decisive. Let’s unpack how this might work.
Rule consequentialists first identify the rules that are best in terms of
impartial welfare (or what’s antecedently desirable), and then specify that
we have decisive reasons to act in accordance with these rules. Finally, they
might add, we have overriding reasons to desire that we so act. This way,
a prohibited act may be ‘best’ according to the antecedent (agent-neutral
welfarist) reasons for desire, and yet be bad (undesirable) all things con-
sidered. This avoids the incoherence mentioned above. But it also brings
out how convoluted the view really is. It is recognizably consequentialist in
the sense that it takes (some) reasons for desire as fundamental, and subse-
quently derives an account of reasons for action. But then it goes back and
“fills in” further reasons for desire — trumping the original axiology — to
make sure that they fit the account of right action. In this sense it exhibits
a deontological streak: reasons for action are at least partly prior to reasons
for desire. In other words, the initial axiology includes only some values
(the ‘non-moral’, agent-neutral welfarist ones), and what’s right serves to
determine the remaining (‘post-moral’, all things considered) good.
On this analysis, the distinction between deontological and consequential-
23 Thanks to Michael Smith for suggesting this interpretation.
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ist moral theories is a matter of the relative priority they assign to reasons for
action and reasons for desire. This is an updated version of the traditional
idea that deontologists take ‘the right’ as prior to (and partly determinative
of) ‘the good’, whereas consequentialists think we can explain what’s right
entirely in terms of promoting non-moral goodness. Though the right and
the good are clearly connected in some way, we may wonder which is more
fundamental: which explains, or is the basis for, the other.
One appealing aspect of this analysis is that it allows us to reject recent
arguments from the possibility of agent-relative value to the conclusion that
really all theories are consequentialist (cf. Louise 2004). Critics of the dis-
tinction have noted, for example, that a deontological prohibition on lying
may prove extensionally equivalent to a consequentialist injunction to max-
imize the agent- and time-relative value of being yourself now honest. But
we are not thereby forced to collapse the distinction between deontology and
consequentialism, so long as we can distinguish the two possible ways the rel-
ative priority might work out. The consequentialist version of the view would
say that one has reason to act honestly because of the antecedent desirability
of being oneself honest. A deontologist, by contrast, might claim the reverse:
that the desirability of being oneself honest instead derives from the inde-
pendent rightness or choiceworthiness of such acts. I think it is important
to maintain this distinction. For while some agent-relative views, e.g. ethical
egoism, may be naturally understood as goal-directed or consequentialist in
nature, it seems a distortion to suggest that traditional deontological views
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are really just about promoting the goal of one’s own moral purity. (Even if
that accurately describes their upshot, it does not seem not a fair character-
ization of what deontological theories present as morally significant.)
6 Does Fitting Choice Collapse into Desirability?
We are now in a position to address what I see as the most pressing objection
to the argument of this paper. I’ve been arguing that the fittingness view
allows us to expand the expressive power of our normative theorizing, by
raising new questions of ‘fitting choice’ over and above questions of value or
desirability. But one might object: why think that there are further normative
facts about ‘fitting choice’, over and above the facts about fitting desire? 24 To
bring out the problem, let us imagine that an agent is faced with a choice
between two actions: she may either φ or ψ. Further suppose that she
has determined that φ-ing is the option that is all things considered most
desirable. Is there any further question here of what she should choose? It
may seem not. Again, it would seem somehow incoherent to think that φ-ing
is the most desirable action, and yet that she ought to ψ instead. Choosing to
ψ is clearly in tension with wanting, all things considered, to φ; it seems that
one or other attitude must be mistaken (inappropriate, unfitting). This may
be taken to suggest that questions of fitting choice are reducible to questions
of fitting desire, so that there is not really any ‘further fact’ here of the sort
that I have suggested.
24 Thanks to Michael Smith for pressing me on this.
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I have three responses to this objection. Firstly, as discussed in foot-
note 14, there may be cases like ‘Buridan’s ass’ in which an agent must
choose between equally desirable options. In such a case, it seems that either
choice (of one over the other) would be fitting, though it would not be fitting
to prefer either option over the other. This suggests a subtle difference be-
tween the norms that govern preference and those that govern choice, albeit
one that may only show itself in a very limited class of situations.
Secondly, even in the remaining cases, I do not think that it is strictly
self-contradictory to claim that what it is fitting to choose diverges from
what it is desirable to do. Instead, like the claim that suffering is good, or
that only the welfare of a certain race of people matters, I take it to merely
be a very obvious but non-analytic falsehood. One could hold the contrary
view without contradiction; it just isn’t remotely plausible as a matter of
substantive normative fact. So our imagined agent, having determined that
it’s most desirable that she φ, does in fact face a further question of whether
she should choose to φ. It merely happens to be a very easy question.
Thirdly, even if one thought that fitting choice and fitting desire must
coincide as a matter of conceptual necessity, no conceptual reduction is pos-
sible if the direction of explanation remains a conceptually open question,
as I think it clearly does. Although act consequentialists think that acts
are choiceworthy in virtue of being all things considered desirable, my pre-
vious section argued that we should understand rule consequentialists and
deontologists as reversing the order of explanation. In the case of rule con-
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sequentialists, we find that some things (e.g. aggregate welfare) are indeed
antecedently desirable, but then facts about what’s choiceworthy intervene
to influence what is ultimately all-things-considered desirable. Deontologists
might even go so far as to take the facts about choiceworthiness as wholly
fundamental and determinative of what’s desirable. Now, I take it to be a
matter of substantive normative fact which of these is the true moral the-
ory. It would be prejudicial for our conceptual framework to take a stand on
this issue. So we should acknowledge that there is room in our normative
theorizing for both ‘fitting choice’ and ‘fitting desire’ assessments, and that
it is a matter of substantive normative fact which of these is prior. There
are two distinct conceptual possibilities here, as there would not be if the
distinction between fitting choice and desirability of choice were to collapse.
So the distinction must be upheld.
One might object that my earlier arguments against Global Consequen-
tialism show that the Fittingness view itself violates the desideratum of neu-
trality between first-order normative theories.25 But I think my analysis is
better understood as showing that Global Consequentialism is not a purely
first-order normative view (in the relevant sense). As we saw in section 4, we
can decompose Global Consequentialism into two components: a first-order
axiology that might be shared by any other form of consequentialism, and
the structural claim (‘structural’ in the sense found in our third desideratum
from §1.1) that the normative domain is flat and symmetrical in structure,
25 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this objection.
Richard Yetter Chappell — Fittingness 31 of 35
such that judgment-sensitive and non-judgment-sensitive evaluands are on a
par. It is only this latter claim that I object to.26
Recall the motivation for neutrality: we wish to select a conceptual frame-
work within which to conduct our first-order inquiry. Even if it were a count
against the Fittingness view that it rules out Global Consequentialism, that’s
clearly still a huge improvement over the value primitivist’s exclusion of every
form of non-consequentialism. But given my analysis of Global Consequen-
tialism in this paper, I don’t think we should really see it as a cost at all.
We’ve seen that, so far as its first-order normative claims are concerned,
Global Consequentialism does not make any further claims beyond Act Con-
sequentialism.27 And the fittingness view is neutral with respect to those
claims. It is only the Global Consequentialist’s assertion of the parity thesis
that is rejected by the Fittingness view. But that’s not a problem, because
one of the desiderata for our conceptual framework is to settle this ‘struc-
tural’ question about the natural joints of the normative domain. We did
not want to remain neutral on that.
Another way to make the point is that adopting value primitivism as
one’s conceptual framework effectively just begs the question against non-
26 And even this is not strictly incompatible with the Fittingness view alone. As ex-
plained in section 3, the Fittingness view provides a formula for determining the scope of
normativity: there will be a kind of normative status corresponding to each kind of ratio-
nal output. So the result that there are other normative assessments to be made besides
assessments of desirability only follows from the Fittingness view once it is supplemented
by the further (albeit obvious) claim that there are other rational outputs besides desires.
27 If anything, it may — as we’ve seen — make fewer claims, if in calling an act ‘right’
they are merely saying that it maximizes value, and not further claiming that it thereby
has the distinct property of being fitting to choose.
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consequentialist views. My arguments for the Fittingness view, by contrast,
have (if successful) shown why the structural elements of Global Consequen-
tialism are mistaken. I have not simply assumed it. So I do not think the
Fittingness view is objectionably prejudicial in this regard.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that we should take fittingness, rather than
value, as our normative primitive. This allows us to say everything that
we could have said using value-talk, and more besides. It helps us to avoid
the misguided global consequentialist idea that judgment-sensitive evaluands
(e.g. choice or action) are ‘on a par with’ — or normatively assessable in all
the same ways as — mere evaluands such as eye colours. Instead, we find
that there’s a distinct property of rightness that applies only to acts, over
and above the property of value (or desirability) that all sorts of evaluands
might have. Finally, the fittingness view, unlike value primitivism, provides
an appropriately ecumenical conceptual framework that remains neutral on
the first-order normative dispute between consequentialism and deontology.
I further argued that the fittingness view is preferable to the pluralist
view that takes both value and rightness as independent primitives. This
is because the fittingness view is more parsimonious, capturing both kinds
of assessment under a single umbrella. And it is more explanatory, in that
it provides us with an account of why there is a distinct normative status
corresponding to acts (namely, because there is a distinct normative status
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corresponding to each class of judgment-sensitive rational outputs, and be-
cause actions, alongside beliefs and desires, are one such type of output).
Overall, the fittingness view provides an elegant conceptual framework that
offers everything we want from a normative primitive.
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